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ABSTRACT 
Techniques are described herein for convicting malicious actors across datasets of 
different origins. The algorithm allows correlation of the available ground truth knowledge 
from one dataset with observations in another dataset. In the network/endpoint security 
field this algorithm allows for conviction of malicious network traffic and identification of 
Command and Control infrastructure of newly detected malware, even if no direct 
communication between binaries and domains is observed. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
In the fields of networking and endpoint security there is a common task which can 
be defined as follows: “Given knowledge of some malicious binaries/domains and some 
relationships between them, identify additional malicious binaries/domains.” There are 
approaches that tackle only one side of this problem, either from the endpoint perspective 
or from the network perspective. 
Both the endpoint and network telemetries may now be observed. Such cross-layer 
visibility opens up the possibility for additional inference tasks, such as: “Given the 
knowledge of some malicious domains, find malicious hashes related to the same threat (or 
vice-versa).” In practice, this task can be translated to solving very specific problems: 
 
1. Given a set of malicious domains, identify malicious hashes that belong to the same 
malware campaign, i.e. attribution of observed malicious domains to specific malware 
campaigns. 
2. Given a set of suspicious domains, confirm that they are malicious (if there are 
malicious binaries related to them). 
3. Given a set of malicious binaries, identify malicious domains related to the binaries, 
thus uncovering the Command and Control infrastructure of the observed malware. This 
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leads to creation of Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that can be used in number of 
network-based security solutions. 
4. Improving efficacy of endpoint and network security products by using known 
IOCs in either network or endpoint layer and projecting to the other layer. 
 
The aforementioned task may be solved by a simple query, assuming one can 
observe direct connections from malicious binaries to malicious domains. Unfortunately, 
this is rarely the case, as most malware (especially with high severity) injects itself into 
legitimate processes. Then, no direct inference of maliciousness between binaries and 
domains may be performed reliably. 
An algorithm is described herein that enables solving the cross-layer learning task 
effectively in a distributed fashion. In particular, the algorithm may convict malicious 
actors across network and endpoint telemetries. Given the access to the telemetry, the 
algorithm may identify a relationship between clients and domains observed in the network 
telemetry, as well as a relationship between clients and binaries observed in the endpoint 
telemetry. The algorithm assumes endpoint and network telemetries are collected over the 
same set of clients. The algorithm is described as follows for the specific case of known 
malicious domains, with the goal of identifying related malicious binaries. 
Since the clients in both telemetry data sets are the same, both domains and binaries 
may be represented in the same space of clients. The algorithm may proceed as follows. 
First, a vector is created for each observed domain. The vectors have lengths equal to the 
number of clients observed in the telemetry data sets, and each element of such vectors 
corresponds to a client node. Elements representing clients connecting to the domain are 
equal to one, and the remaining elements have value of zero. Next, L2 normalization is 
applied for each vector.  
Second, a vector is created for each observed binary. The vectors have lengths equal 
to the number of clients observed in the telemetry data sets, and each element of such 
vectors corresponds to a client node. Elements representing clients hosting the binary are 
equal to one, and the remaining elements have a value of zero. Next, L2 normalization is 
applied for each vector.  
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Third, a subspace is spanned by the set of vectors representing the ground truth (i.e., 
domains that are known to be malicious). A linear subspace may be created which contains 
all vectors associated with malicious domains. Fourth, the basis W may be found for the 
subspace using QR decomposition or a similar technique. Fifth, an orthogonal projection 
of vectors representing binaries to the hyperplane defined by W may be calculated. Sixth, 
the maliciousness score may be calculated as an absolute value of the projection vector. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the intersection between datasets. Endpoint telemetry (B-
C) and network telemetry (C-D) share the same set of clients. As a result of the 
vectorization procedure, some domain D and binary B are associated with vectors D={1, 
1, 1, 0} and B={1, 0, 1, 1} respectively. After the L2 normalization, the vectors become 
D={1.732, 1.732, 1.732, 0} and B={1.732, 0, 1.732, 1.732}. 
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Figure 1 
The obtained score may be treated as the probability of a binary being related to the 
infection that is causing the network traffic. Thus one can attribute the malicious network 
traffic to a specific malware family and/or convict suspicious traffic as malicious. The 
algorithm may be reversible: given the knowledge of malicious binaries, one might aim to 
identify malicious domains constituting the Command and Control infrastructure of a 
specific malware family.  
This algorithm may be extended to any number of datasets. The only requirement 
for the datasets is to share some common entities that may be used as representation (e.g., 
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use the same set of clients). Also, the algorithm may be used in a single domain. For 
example, given the knowledge of malicious domains, it may be possible to identify other 
malicious domains. The same goes for binaries. In fact, this algorithm may be used to 
efficiently solve a multitude of tasks. 
In summary, techniques are described herein for convicting malicious actors across 
datasets of different origins. The algorithm allows correlation of the available ground truth 
knowledge from one dataset with observations in another dataset. In the network/endpoint 
security field this algorithm allows for conviction of malicious network traffic and 
identification of Command and Control infrastructure of newly detected malware, even if 
no direct communication between binaries and domains is observed. 
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